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Elana Wilson Rowe and Helge Blakkisrud
Russia has attracted attention of late for two quite dif-
ferent Arctic efforts – the planting of a Russian flag on 
the seabed under the North Pole and the resolution of 
the delimitation issue in the Barents Sea with Norway. 
The contrast between the two events is striking. While 
the flag planting brings to mind the patriotic pursuit of 
national interest and an imagery of the old-fashioned 
land grab, the process around the delimitation agree-
ment is replete with an assiduous attention to inter-
national law and overtones of good neighbourliness. 
In this project, we have taken a fresh look at Russia’s 
Arctic policy and engagement. This policy has both 
a domestic and an international dimension. The di-
vision between the two partly coincides with the on-
shore/offshore divide (11.9 million km2 of Northern 
Russia and Siberia is defined as the Russian ‘North’ 
and subject to special ‘Northern’ legislation and privi-
leges). Our focus here has been on the international/
offshore dimension. 
We argue that Russian actors today primarily see the 
Arctic as an international relations zone where coop-
eration, a positive image and stable relations with the 
‘West’ are achievable and valued ends. However, in 
order to understand whether this approach is simply 
the attitude of the moment or something more institu-
tionalized, we ask the following questions:
• How durable is this approach? To what extent is the 
current policy firmly anchored within the current 
political establishment rather than an expression of 
more narrow sector interests? 
• To what degree could non-regional problems and 
frustrations poison the current positive approach 
to Arctic cooperation?
In order to answer these questions, we have adopted 
a two-pronged approach: first we have reviewed Rus-
sian Arctic discourses as observed in recently released 
policy documents and in public debate in the media; 
second, in order to examine the extent to which these 
particular discourses or representations of the Arctic 
are manifested in practice, we have interviewed civil 
servants from the ‘Arctic Five’ (Russia, Norway, Den-
mark, Canada and the US).
Russian discourses on the Arctic
The media analysis was based on the coverage of Arc-
tic issues in the official newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta 
from May 2008 (the onset of Medvedev’s presidential 
term) until the end of June 2011. A total of 323 articles 
were analysed and coded for content. Our aim was to 
understand how the Arctic has been represented in 
Russian sources and to trace how this representation 
has changed over the past three years. The key find-
ings from this analysis include:
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Figure 1: Russian media coverage: ‘conflict’ vs. 
‘cooperation’
2Policy Brief 2 · 2012
Figure 2. Coverage of Arctic issues in Rossiiskaya gazeta 2008–11
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First, media coverage representing the Arctic as a 
zone for cooperation, rather than conflict, grew stead-
ily between 2008 and 2011 (see Figure 1). A great deal 
of coverage in this cooperative tone was generated 
by international cooperation activities, ranging from 
high-level ministerial meetings in the Arctic Council 
to new programs in the University of the Arctic. More 
competition oriented articles are also triggered by dis-
crete events. For example, Canadian military exercises 
in the North, NATO activity in the North, and the visit 
of the Canadian foreign minister to Moscow generated 
more conflict-oriented commentary.
Second, there is no one driver of policy/media atten-
tionto Arctic issues. Concern for energy or security 
issues in the articles analyzed was fairly matched by 
attention to other issues, such as Arctic research. If 
any on issue can be said to dominate, it is domestic 
concerns around the Russian territorial North, such as 
environmental issues, research, living standards and 
domestic economic development (see Figure 2).
Third, in terms of policy actors, the range of persons 
speaking about Arctic politics increased markedly 
through the three years covered in this study. While 
the MFA and the Presidential Administration were 
the dominant voices in 2008 and 2009, by 2010 the 
debate around the Arctic had clearly spread to other 
institutions in Moscow, including the Ministry of De-
fence, Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development, Ministry of Transport, Federal 
Assembly, FSB (Border Services), Security Council, 
as well as to regional institutions. This growth in the 
number of ‘Arctic actors’ suggests that Russia is aware 
of the myriad of ways in which Arctic sovereignty can 
be demonstrated and Russia’s interests in the Arctic 
pursued. Canadian Prime Minster Stephen Harper’s 
‘use it or lose it’ statement, which attracted so much 
attention in Russia, has not been interpreted primarily 
through a military or security optic. While strengthen-
ing the border services has been an important part of 
Arctic policy of late, there is also an increased empha-
sis on economic presence and research. 
Russian practice in the Arctic
The second step of our project was to examine the ex-
tent to which the discourses or representations of the 
Arctic we identified in Russian media are manifested 
in practice. In particular, we were interested in the 
question of non-regional spillovers (e.g. did the 2008 
war with Georgia sour Arctic cooperation?). In order 
to assess this, we carried out 19 semi-structured inter-
views with civil servants from Russia, Norway, Cana-
da, the US, and Denmark involved in ongoing Arctic 
cooperation. The key findings from the interviews are:
First, Russian interviewees argued that there is wide 
agreement across sectors in Moscow about Russia’s 
3current, low threat, cooperation-oriented and inter-
nationally-law minded approach to the Arctic. As one 
Russian interviewee put it, ‘There are no longer com-
peting visions for Arctic development.’
Second, all interviewees noted that Russia had an in-
creasingly positive attitude towards Arctic cooperation 
over the past three years. They argue that Russia has 
invested effort into developing and filling with content 
a positive, leadership-oriented image in policy fields 
seen as interesting from a Russian perspective (prima-
rily oil spills and search and rescue).
Third, no interviewees dealing with explicitly Arctic 
cooperation noticed any negative spillover from the 
war with Georgia on Arctic cooperation. In fact, some 
Russian and non-Russian interviewees noted a posi-
tive spillover in that both the US and Russia began en-
gaging more substantively in Arctic relations around 
this time. 
Conclusions 
Russia’s approach to the Arctic appears to be fairly in-
stitutionalized across various au tho r i ties in Moscow 
and is, consequently, buffered against extra-regional 
conflict.
As to Russia’s relations with the other Arctic states, 
Russia has sought to disaggregate foreign policy geo-
graphically and across issue areas, trying to achieve 
some positive developments internationally in the 
Arctic even when relations with the ‘West’ were oth-
erwise at a low point (e.g. the 2008 war with Georgia 
and the controversy over plans about a US-led missile 
shield in Europe). This is in contrast to the oft-cited 
idea that Russia goes through periods of being ‘for or 
against the West.’ 
Still, moments of uncertainty do remain. Two such 
moments are:
1)  How the Arctic states decide to deal with China’s 
increasing interest in the North will be important. 
Russia is active in defending the privileges of Arc-
tic states, while the US, in particular, is for the idea 
of an open Arctic Council. 
2)  An American failure to ratify UNCLOS could have 
repercussions. As one Canadian interviewee put it, 
‘Might this be music to the ears of some on the 
Security Council who would prefer to write rather 
than follow international law?’
Policy recommendations
• The 2007 flag planting shows us that there is still 
some room for a difference of opinion in the pur-
suit of Russia’s Arctic goals and that the political 
space remains for the expression of it. However, 
the delimitation agreement, in that it required the 
involvement of the Russian leadership, likely has 
more to say about dominant Russian domestic po-
litical commitments and discourse. The Security 
Council has played an important role as a facilitator 
of the new policy platform. This should not, how-
ever, be seen as a step towards ‘securitization’ of 
the Arctic, but is rather a result of the council being 
a forum where all the major stakeholders are rep-
resented. We have, to the contrary, observed a wid-
ening of the political field, with the relevant sector 
ministries playing a more active role in the Arctic 
debate.
• Several interviewees (both Russian and Western) 
noted the importance of keeping budget constraints 
in mind when interpreting Russia’s Arctic plans. 
Despite the stated Russian interest in developing 
Arctic infrastructure (including the Northern Sea 
Route), one should be aware of the gap between 
stated interests and the costs involved – Russian 
policy declarations are often divorced from fiscal 
realities and should not necessarily be taken at face 
value.
• Arctic cooperation has to some extent been facili-
tated by the ‘reset’ in US–Russia relations. Should 
a change in the presidential administration in the 
US lead to a harder line towards Russia there could 
be repercussions for international relations in the 
Arctic. However, that Arctic cooperation intensi-
fied at the same time as Russia’s relations with the 
West reached a new low due to the Georgian war 
suggests that a policy or administration change in 
the US will not necessarily have serious negative 
effects on regional Arctic cooperation. At any rate, 
one should not infer an automatic spillover from 
one vector of Russia’s foreign policy to another.
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